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Gunnow: Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations

Full Faith and Credit
in Three Federations
The HonorableMr. Justice W.M. C. Gummow
The purpose of this Paper is to compare and contrast the operation of two
federal constitutional mechanisms in the United States, Canada, and Australia.
Both concern civil rather than criminal law.' The first mechanism is the
service and execution of the process and enforcement of the judgments of the
courts of the states and provinces. The second is "choice of law" and
conflicts between the laws of the various states and provinces in their
substantive operation upon common subject matter in civil cases. A particular
concern is with statutes (a) that adopt for their operation connecting factors
differing from those of common-law choice of law analogues and (b) whose
operation extends to events and circumstances occurring or found within the
federation, but outside the territory of the enacting legislature.
The relevant Australian constitutional provisions were drawn a century
ago and avowedly with the United States Constitution in mind.2 There is no
relevant express provision in the Canadian Constitution, but in considering the
implications of the Canadian federal structure, the Supreme Court of Canada
considered the American and Australian experiences. 3

* A Judge of the Federal Court of Australia. On March 28, 1995, Justice Gummow was
recommended for appointment as Justice of the High Court of Australia. He was confirmed and
took the oath of office on April 18, 1995.
1. Special considerations apply where the laws of several states operate to render the same
conduct a criminal offence. That subject is discussed by Mr. M.J. Leeming, with reference to
authorities such as Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), in his article "Resolving Conflicts
Between State Criminal Laws" 12 Australian Bar Review 107 (1994-5). It is outside the scope
of this paper. However, one point should be noted. The decisions dealing with the application
of full faith and credit to statutes, in addition to service of process and enforcement of judgments,
largely commenced only a century ago. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments and PublicActs, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 73-74 (1957). The reasons for this may have
included the greater devotion of state legislative activity in earlier times to the criminal law,
rather than to economic and other regulatory activity, and the narrower views once taken in the
United States as to the extra-territorial competence of state legislatures.
2. JOHN QUICK & ROBERT R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 620-21, 961-64 (1901). The concern of Griffith, Barton, and
Isaacs (founding fathers who became justices of the High Court) appears exclusively to have been
with full faith and credit as to service and execution of process and registration of judgments.
Cowen, Full Faith and Credit: The Australian Experience, in ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION 293, 298-301 (Else-Mitchell ed. 2d ed. 1961).
3. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1100-01 (Can.); Hunt v. Lac
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

It is best to begin with the constitutional texts of the United States and
Australia. Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution states: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State; and the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." 4
The Australian constitutional provisions are contained in sections 51 and 118,
as follows:
51.

118.

The Parliament shall, *subjectto this Constitution, have power
to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
the Commonwealth with respect to:-

(xxiv)

The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of
the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the courts
of the States:

(xxv)

The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws,
the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of
the States:
Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the
judicial proceedings of every State.5

Neither in Canada nor in Australia is there any express adoption of the
part of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-

d'Amiante du Quebec Ltee, [19931 4 S.C.R. 289 (Can.).
4. Congress has acted only in a limited fashion. Title 28, U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), which took
this form in 1948, states:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory
or Possession, or copies thereof,... so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988), added in 1980 by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, requires
full faith and credit to be given to certain child custody determinations.
5. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 51, 118.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/15

2

Gunnow: Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations

1995]

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

tion that provides: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..
.6 On its face, Section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights appears to be drawn more narrowly by excluding
any reference to property. However, in place of "due process of law" there
is the phrase "fundamental justice."' This constitutional provision has been
treated as a substantive concept by the Supreme Court of Canada and used to
strike down various laws in fields other than those with which this paper is
concerned. 8 In Australia, many issues of due process that elsewhere would
be regarded as constitutional are left to the common law.' There is, for
example, no implication from the nature of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and the separation of powers effected by the Constitution which
prevents the Parliament from declaring that a person is guilty of a crime
against federal law by reason of having committed a past act that, when done,
was not a crime.10 In the United States, before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment full faith and credit held the field." The coexistence of
constitutionally mandated full faith and credit and due process has assumed an
important role in recent United States jurisprudence. This coexistence also is
significant in contrast with that of the other federations. In Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague 2 Justice Brennan explained that in deciding what he called
"choice-of-law cases" the Supreme Court had taken a similar approach when
applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that even though the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and Due Process Clause had been treated as though they were
indistinguishable, the two constitutional provisions protected different interests

6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. CAN. CONST. § 7. The Section states, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice." Id.
8. PETER HOGG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA §§ 33.4(b), 44. 10 (3d ed. 1992). There
is a suggestion in Morguardthat Section 7 may have a role in the development of a full faith and
credit doctrine. Morguard, 3 S.C.R. at 1110.
9. The content of the common law is in some flux. For example, while the common law of
Australia does not recognize the right of an accused to be provided with counsel at public
expense, a court may stay a prosecution that would result in an unfair trial for want of legal
representation: Dietrich v. The Queen, 177 C.L.R. 292 (Austl. 1992).
10. See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl. 1991). However,
Polyukhovich did suggest that a bill of attainder probably would be invalid, even though not
mentioned in the Australian Constitution. The privilege against self incrimination also is not
protected by the constitution. See Sorby v. Commonwealth, 152 C.L.R. 281, 298-99 (Austl.
1983).
11. Lea Brilmayer, CreditDueJudgments and CreditDueLaws: The Respective Roles ofDue
Processand Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IowA L. REV. 95, 96-97 (1984)
("mhe Supreme Court became involved in policing state assertions of long arm jurisdiction,
citing full faith and credit, before the fourteenth amendment was even adopted.").
12. 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
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and required separate consideration.' 3 Full faith and credit directs each state,
"when acting as a forum for litigation having multistate aspects or implications, [to] respect the legitimate interests of the other States and avoid
infringement upon their sovereignty. "'4 Due process protects the interest of
litigants in a fair adjudication of their rights.' 5 Another view of the distinction is that due process has come to represent centrifugal forces in the
federation because the powers of each state are limited, preventing any one
from applying its own law to all legal issues and from bringing all legal
disputes before its courts, while full faith and credit represents the centripetal
force in the federation. 6
WHAT IS FULL FAITH AND CREDIT? IS IT "CHOICE OR LAW?"

The phrase "faith and credit" appears to have first entered the decisions
of the English courts of common law by means of what now would be
considered a branch of the law of res judicata and issue estoppel, concerning
decisions of courts operating within one domestic legal system, but each with
a distinct field of subject matter jurisdiction.
Faith and credit was used to describe the effect given in other English
courts to issues previously determined by proceedings in ecclesiastical courts.
One example concerned an action for trespass brought in the Queen's Bench
by a parson claiming to have been wrongfully deprived of his living by an
ecclesiastical tribunal. '7 Another was the trial in 1776 of the Duchess of
Kingston for bigamy.'" In that case, the accused argued that the court should
give faith and credit to an earlier decision of an ecclesiastical court against the
marriage in a suit for jactitation of marriage. However, as indicated by the
unanimous opinion of the judges, the effect given to the earlier ecclesiastical
decision was evidentiary in nature; it did not provide a plea in bar. Accordingly, other evidence was admissible to show, for example, that the earlier
proceeding had been tainted by fraud.' 9
13. Id. at 320-32. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 824 (1985), Justice
Stevens said that the majority opinion wrongly failed to consider separately the fairness of the
Kansas Court's decision, and the potential impact of the Kansas choice of law on the concerns
of other interested states.
14. Id. at 322.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 110. In Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41, 132
(Austl. 1988), Justice Deane understated the United States position in saying that section 118 of
the Australian Constitution was "uncomplicated by the competition of a possibly overlapping due
process clause."
Id. (citation omitted).
17. Caudrey's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1, 8-9 (1591).
18. The Trial of the Duchess of Kingston for Bigamy, 20 State Trials 355, 400, 513 (1776).
19. Id. at 540.
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It may be that the expression "full faith and credit" adopted in the
Articles of Confederation, and later in the United States Constitution, was
designed to provide greater substance. In this vein, Story indicated that "full"
was adopted to emphasize that "positive and absolute verity" was to be
attributed to the judgments of each state.'
It is one thing to give absolute verity to a judgment in which a dispute as
to law or fact has been reduced to a specific outcome. It is another in the very
course of the judicial determination to resolve one or more issues, not by
reference to the law administered by a specialist court nor by the general law
of the forum, but by the law of another forum.
As a matter of daily experience in a common law system, this may come
about for one or more of several reasons. First, the statutory law of the forum
may pick up the law of another jurisdiction. An example is the adoption by
each of the Australian States of statutes passed by the federal Parliament to
provide the corporate law of the Australian Capital Territory, creating a
uniform cooperative scheme for corporate law in Australia.2" Secondly, the
common law rules of choice of law may, if not displaced by statutory law of
the forum, select a foreign law as the lex causae of one or more issues. It
may be that, in its terms, the foreign law purports to govern the disposition by
the forum of the dispute in question, but if that law is applied as the lex causae
by the forum, it is not by its own force, but by reason of the operation of the
choice of law rules of the forum in one of the ways outlined above. It should
be noted that, the existence in Australia of a unified common law means that
choice of law issues arise at the interstate level only when one state has
legislated and the other has not or, in contrast with the United States system,
when both have legislated.
In many instances, the courts of two jurisdictions, by reason of their
respective choice of law rules, each apply only their domestic law as the lex
causae without regard to the law of the other. Such practice may encourage
forum shopping and also may lead to concurrent proceedings in different
jurisdictions. The second situation is the concern of the developing law as to
forum non conveniens. Further, the law as to res judicata and issue estoppel
with respect to foreign judgments,' with or without local registration

20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1304

(1833). See also the early authorities referred to by Justice Deane in Breavington, 169 C.L.R.
at 129. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 1 at 44.
21. The scheme is explained further in Acton Engineering Pty Ltd. v. Campbell, 31 F.C.R.
1, 8-11 (Austl. 1991).
22. Tanning Research Labs. Inc. v. O'Brien, 169 C.L.R. 332, 346 (Austl. 1990); Dallal v.
Bank Mellat, [1986] Q.B. 441; House of Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite, [1991] 1 Q.B. 241,25254; Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco, [1992] 2 A.C. 443,484 (I.L.); Republic of India v. India S.S.
Co. Ltd., [1993] App. Cas. 410, 417-18 (H.L.); Showlag v. Mansour, [1994] 2 All E.R. 129,
133; see also Enid Campbell, Res Judicataand Decisions of ForeignTribunals 16 SYDNEY L.
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systems, attempts to specify the degree of preclusive effect in one jurisdiction
of a judgment in another. As indicated above, such preclusion was the initial
concern of full faith and credit within the United States' federal system.
However, such situations are not choice-of-law problems as described in the
last paragraph.
The expression "conflict of laws" frequently is used to describe the
common law choice-of-law rules as described above. The term "conflict" is
an unhappy one when used in this context. The point was well made in
Dicey's Conflict of Laws:3
The name ["conflict of laws"] is not altogether satisfactory. It covers only
that part of the subject which deals with the choice of law to the exclusion
of the issue of jurisdiction, which is in our view an essential part of the
subject. The only 'conflict' possible is, moreover, that in the mind of the
judge who has to decide which system of law to apply to the facts before
him, and in many cases the proper choice must be so simple that the term
is quite out of place as a description of his mental attitude. There is much
to be said for preferring the simpler 'choice of law', the term 'choice'
sufficiently indicating the existence of the possibility of applying one or
other system of law to the facts of the case under consideration. Retention
of the title 'conflict of laws' is justified merely by the obvious inconvenience of changing the name, which through the example of Story has won
a certain degree of authority.24
The learned editors distinguished "jurisdiction" from "choice of law."
The term "jurisdiction," particularly when used in a federal judicial system,
has several distinct meanings. Its primary meaning is the amenability of the
defendant to the court's writ, which, without legislative extension, does not
run beyond the territorial limits of the local sovereign authority. The term
also may be used to identify authority to adjudicate upon particular subject
matter and to grant relief of a particular kind.' In the exercise of jurisdiction in this sense, the common law choice-of-law rules may have a decisive
operation in some cases, for example, supplying a foreign lex causae. Finally,
there is the distinct non common laws concept of federal jurisdiction, the

REv. 311, 313-22 (1994).
23. (J.H.C. Morris ed. 6th ed. 1949). The distinguished assistant editors included the future
Sir Zelman Cowen, Sir Rupert Cross, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, and Professors Kurt Lipsten and
Clive Parry.
24. Id. at 7. A passage to the same effect appeared in the 1927 4th edition at page 11. This
was the first edition to appear after the death of Dicey in 1922. The substance of the passage set
out above appears in the 1993 12th edition at page 33; this edition is under the general editorship
of Mr. Lawrence Collins.
25. The distinction between these meanings of jurisdiction is clearly drawn in Flaherty v.
Girgis, 162 C.L.R. 574, 598 (Austl. 1987).
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authority to adjudicate derived from the Constitution. The Constitution
identifies this authority by reference to subject matter and parties. Some
actions arising in federal jurisdiction (e.g. actions between states) have no
parallel in common law. It should give one pause to apply the common law
choice-of-law rules to those actions without common law parallels.
There may be differences among the choice-of-law rules accepted by the
jurisdictions that have some connection to the dispute in question. Thus, the
choice of law made by the forum usually will depend upon the classification
by the forum of the claim or issue in question (e.g. as one in tort or contract)
and the characterization of the facts so as to select the appropriate connecting
factor (e.g. this tort was committed in Quebec). The foreign law then selected
may itself classify the claim or issue differently or select a different connecting
factor. Again, does the choice of the lex causae carry with it the selection of
the choice-of-law rules of that foreign law? These may prefer the law of a
third jurisdiction as the lex causae. Such differences in classification 6r
characterization and the rules as to renvoi have been said to demonstrate the
operation of rules of choice of law "in the second degree," to be resolved by
what truly are "conflict rules.'26
When used in a federal system, "conflict" has a meaning quite different
to any with which choice of law is concerned. The failure to appreciate this
and the blurring of the distinction has caused much mischief. Within one
jurisdiction of a federation, the laws of several legislatures may operate and
clash in doing so. The conflict between national and state or provincial law
is resolved by the primacy given federal law by express provision in Australia
(section 109 of the Constitution) and by express or implied statements of
federal supremacy in the United States and Canada.27
In Australian constitutional law the term "repugnancy" has been used to
identify the clash between Imperial and local laws,2" and "inconsistency"
(expressed in section 109 of the constitution) between federal and state laws;
the Australian Capital Territory now has self government and the criterion is
that a provision of Territory law will be consistent with federal law "to the
extent" that it is "capable of operating concurrently with it."29 This adds a

26. LEVONTIN, CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 2-4 (1976).

27. The Canadian courts have not applied the "covering the field" doctrine, which assists
federal legislative supremacy in Australia and the United States. HoGG, supra note 8, § 16.4(a).
28. Until the adoption by the Australian Parliament in 1942 of the Statute of Westminster 1931
(Imp.), it was a colonial legislature whose laws might be rendered void by the Colonial Laws
Validity Act 1865, section 2, as "repugnant" to laws of the Imperial Parliament. In Canada,
which then did not include Newfoundland, the 1931 statute immediately had been operative with
respect to both the federal and provincial legislatures. This was the effect of sections 2 and 7.
The Australian States were finally emancipated from the 1865 Act only by the AustraliaActs
1986.
29. Nominal Defendant v. Morrison, 37 F.C.R. 479, 483 (1992).
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further dimension to the operation of contrariety in the Australian legal
system. In the United Kingdom, any apparent clash between a law of the
British Parliament and the supremacy of European Union law established by
section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 (U.K.) is decided by asking
whether the British law is "incompatible" with the relevant European law.30
There may be a clash between the laws of the states in the federation.
This may arise by reason of the direct operation of the law of one state in the
territory of another. It may also arise where the "laws of two or more States
which, by their terms or in their operation, affect the same persons, transactions or relationships."31 We have it on the recent authority of the United
States Supreme Court that the Founding Fathers acted in the expectation that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause "would be interpreted against the background
of principles developed in international conflicts law."32 However, the courts
and legislatures of the Canadian and Australian colonies before federation, and
of the states before the adoption of the United States Constitution, were not
called on to grapple with a particular aspect of the distribution of powers in
a federal system, the existence of concurrent, but limited, legislative
authorities in a group of law areas.
Because of this concurrence, full faith and credit is important, not only
with regard to the significance to be given to judgments within the federation
but also, on a larger scale, with respect to conflicting laws of the several
component states.
Professor Laycock illustrates this point in the following statement:
To simultaneously apply the conflicting law of two states is impossible; to
require each state to apply the law of the other is absurd; and to let each
state apply its own law repeals the Clause. Sister-state law cannot be
equal in any of these senses. The requirement that each state apply the
same law is comprehensible only on the assumption that there are
occasions when the law of a sister state applies and occasions when it does
not. The Full Faith and Credit Clause thus assumes the existence of
choice-of-law rules, but it does not specify what those rules are.33
However, it may be confidently suggested that it is unlikely that the constitutional mandate requires a second state to give to the laws of the home state a

30. Equal Opportunities Comm'n v. Secretary of State for Employment, [1994] 1 All E.R.
910, 920, 923-24 (H.L.).
31. Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen's Ass'n Inc. v. The State of S. Austl. 168
C.L.R. 340, 374 (Austl. 1989).
32. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
33. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 297 (1992).
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greater measure of faith and credit than is required by the home state itself.
Thus, if the law of the home state does not purport to have a direct
operation in the territory of the second state nor in its operation to affect the
same persons, transactions, or relationships as are reached by the laws of the
second state, where is the conflict in the constitutional sense? Why should the
constitution give to the law of the home state a greater reach than the
legislature claimed for it? This is an aspect of full faith and credit to which
it will be necessary to return later in this paper, particularly with reference to
the respective operations of the laws of Alaska and California that were in
issue in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of
34
California.
There is much to be said for the explanation of the relationship between
full faith and credit and general choice-of-law rules given by Professor D. St.
Leger Kelly in his valuable monograph Localizing Rules in the Conflict of

Laws.35 Professor Kelly refers to the application by the forum of statutory
provisions of a sister state to cases that they are not expressed to cover as
involving the granting to that legislation of greater faith and credit than section
118 demands. He continues:
[S]ection 118 requires animadversion to the claims made by sister state
law, since only then can adequate content be given to the terms 'faith' and
'credit' in the constitutional provision. General choice of law rules, on the
other hand, delimit the scope of the application of sister state laws in the
forum not by reference to the express or implied claims to application
made by these laws, but upon independent forum determination of the
appropriateness of dealing with cases involving both forum and foreign
incidents by treating them either as totally foreign cases or as totally forum
ones.

34. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
35. D. St. Leger Kelly, LOCALIZING RULES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 103-05 (1974).
The learned author later wrote:
Once a claim to application is made by sister-state law, full faith and credit must
become relevant. Indeed, it may be that it is only when such a claim is made that full
faith and credit is a relevant factor. To give full faith and credit to sister-state law
only when forum choice of law rules point to the sister-state is to give full faith and
credit to one's own law rather than to that of the sister state, a fact which the unity
of the common law in Australia has so far concealed.
D. St. Leger Kelly, " Chief Justice Bray and the Conflict of Laws" (1980-81) 7 ADEL. L. REV.
17, 27-28.
Professors Sykes and Pryles also prefer a construction of § 118 as a curb on certain types of
extra-territorial statutes, so that the sister-state statute may be denied an overextensive effect:
SYKEs & PRYLE, AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 330-34 (3d ed. 1991).
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What must not be asserted, however, is that general choice of law rules in
their other regarding sense, that is, simply as indicating the applicability
of a system other than that of which they form part, are in themselves an

object of section 118. It is hardly conceivable that the forum should be
required to take account of section 118 merely because, had the case been
brought in a sister state forum, the latter (owing to a difference in the
general choice of law rules of the two states) would have applied a
different decisional rule from that applied in the forum. If the sister state
law makes no claim to application itself, the fact that the courts of that
state would refer a given case to a third state does not of itself make the
law of that state relevant before the actual forum. Only the law of that
third state can determine whether it seeks application to a given case and,
subject to one qualification, it is only when that claim is made that full
faith and credit can become relevant. How could it be claimed that the
forum has denied full faith and credit to the law of a third state when that
law would not be applied to the instant case by the courts of that state?
Moreover, so far as the second state is concerned, its choice of law rules,
in their other regarding aspect, themselves make no claim to application
anywhere but in the courts of that state.36
Where there is no constitutional conflict between state laws, and the
common-law choice-of-law rules create inconsistent results, opportunity for
forum shopping will exist despite the existence of section 118. Thus, there is
a related but distinct issue. It has attracted the attention of the judges forming
the minority in a series of recent cases in the High Court of Australia
commencing with Breavington v. Godleman.37 This case concerns the impact
upon the common-law choice-of-law rules as they exist in the various states of
the national legal structure created by a federal constitution. Is it an
implication of that federal structure that the common-law rules must be
adjusted so that, matters of procedure aside, the same substantive legal
consequences will flow from a particular act or omission within the national
jurisdiction, regardless of the particular state forum in which the relevant
dispute is adjudicated?
Take, for example, a common-law choice-of-law rule that requires the
plaintiff to make out a substantive case not only under the common law and
statutory law of that jurisdiction in the federation in which the relevant acts or
omissions occurred, but also under the common law and statutory law of the
forum. Does the existence of a national legal system mandate, as a matter of
constitutional law, a choice-of-law rule that requires compliance only with the
lex loci delicti? If the answer is affirmative, the result will be to alleviate
somewhat the perceived evil of forum shopping. However, the circumstance

36. KELLY, supra note 35.
37. 169 C.L.R. 41 (Austl. 1988).
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that the statutes of the forum and the relevant other jurisdiction are inconsistent
involves no more than that the common law has imposed a double-barrelled
lex causae. That situation, in my view, is not the type of case in which the
full faith and credit clause is called upon to resolve any conflict in the laws of
the states.
It is appropriate at this stage to refer further to certain peculiarities of the
Australian federal system, an appreciation of which assists in perceiving the
different regimes that apply as to service and execution of process and as to
choice of law in full faith and credit doctrine.
In particular, differences in the nature of the United States and Australian
federal systems, comparatively subtle though some of them may appear,
provide an important context in which rather different approaches have been
taken to the choice-of-law aspect of full faith and credit. Such differences
appear not only between the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and the High Court of Australia, but also within the courts themselves.
I turn to consider these differences.
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
First, unlike the situation in Canada and the United States, all components
of the Australian federal system are purely common law based. For better or
worse, the French never settled any. part of this continent. Second, as a
practical (and, in my view, doctrinal) matter, there is no distinct common law
in one or the other state.
Nearly forty years ago, Sir Owen Dixon spoke of the Australian judge,
federal or state, as administering "the common law as an entire system" and,
adapting and contrasting a famous passage in the judgment of Justice Holmes
in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co. ,38 said that an Australian judge was not bound "to resist the
impression that there is one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the
only task of any court concerned.""
The High Court of Australia expressly declares the common law of
Australia (including the common law rules as to choice of law), not the
common law of the state or territory whence the appeal came or in which a
federal court sat.4" The Parliament of the Commonwealth requires courts

38. 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
39. Owen Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate ConstitutionalFoundation,31 AUSTL.
L.J. 240, 241 (1957).
40. Five significant and recent examples are Burnie Port Auth. v. General Jones Pty. Ltd.,
179 C.L.R. 520 (Austl. 1994) (the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher); Env't Protection Authority v.
Caltex Ref. Co. Pty Ltd. 178 C.L.R. 477, 490, 556 (Austl. 1993) (corporate privilege against
self incrimination); Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433, 453 (Austl. 1993) (interstate torts);
Dietrich v. The Queen, 177 C.L.R. 292, 297-98, 311 (Austl. 1992) (right to a fair trial); and
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exercising federal jurisdiction to apply "the common law of Australia."'" To
quote again from Sir Owen Dixon, speaking in the United States in 1943:
"You will see that, under the Australian conception, while on the one hand
there is neither need nor room for the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,42 on the
other hand the basal principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 43 is
contradicted. "4
The modem view in the United States is that for the purposes of full faith
and credit, state law is embodied in case law as well as in statutes.45
However, given the general operation of an Australian common law, there is
no occasion for full faith and credit to operate upon decisions as to the
common law of the courts of the several states; any conflict between decisions
upon the common law is for ultimate resolution in the High Court of Australia.
Third, while, as in the United States, reference is made from time to time
to the states as sovereign entities for the purposes of the application inter se
of private international law rules (a significant point to which I will return) the
Australian states are more directly the objects of federal jurisdiction.
Paragraph 75(iv) of the Constitution creates as a head of federal jurisdiction
matters between states and between residents of different states. This
paragraph also expressly includes matters between a state and a resident of
another state,46 litigation that in the United States will take place in state
courts and involve issues of "sovereign immunity." These were considered
in Nevada v. Hall.47 Fourth, in their accrued or pendent jurisdiction
(developed from the root provided by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v.
United States Bank)," federal courts often construe significant state legislation;49 in any event all such legislation receives its most authoritative

Mabo v. The State of Queensland [No. 2], 175 C.L.R. 1, 69-71, 109-113 (Austl. 1992) (native
title).
41. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), § 80, as amended by the Law and Justice Legislation
Amendment Act 1988 (Cth). As originally enacted, "the common law of England" was to apply;
see Adams v. Eta Foods Ltd. 19 F.C.R. 93, 95 (1987). It should also be noted that § 77 of the
Constitution authorizes laws to invest federal jurisdiction not only in federal courts, but in the
courts of the states, and that § 80 of the Judiciary Act applies to all courts exercising federal
jurisdiction.
42. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
43. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
44. Sources of LegalAuthority in JEsTING PILATE 198, 202 (1965).
45. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 290-91 (1992).
46. Comm'r for Rys. for the State of Queensland v. Peters, 24 N.S.W.L.R. 407 (1991).
47. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
48. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 819-21 (1824) (superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988)).
49. Recentexamples are Mid Density Devs. Pty. Ltd. v. RockdaleMun. Council, 116 A.L.R.
460 (1993) (Local GovernmentAct 1919 (N.S.W.)); Farrow Mortgage Servs. Pty. Ltd. (In Liq.)
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interpretation by the High Court, which is a "national," but federal, court of
final and general appeal.
One consequence of these four factors is that in Australia there is no
doctrine of federal court abstention (or, indeed, abstention between the courts
of the states) by reason of unclear state law, whereby, for example, a federal
court stays its proceeding for a ruling by a state court on a state law
question.5 0
Fifth, the occasion in American choice of laws for disputation as to
matters of divorce and family law, provided by the existence of separate state
domiciles, no longer exists in Australia. Litigation pertaining to marriage,
divorce, matrimonial property, and much other family law is controlled by
federal legislation, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth); this states as the
connecting factors Australian citizenship, domicile, or residence (section 39)
and provides for the effect of decrees throughout Australia (section 103).
Sixth, it is common for counsel to have a right of appearance in the courts
of several states (and in any federal court) and to exercise that right. This
state of affairs may become the norm with the coming into force of the Mutual
Recognition Act 1992 (Cth). Pursuant to it a lawyer registered in one state
ordinarily will be entitled, upon giving notice to the regulatory authority in
another state, to registration there. This is federal legislation passed upon
references by the state legislatures pursuant to section 51(xxxvii) of the
Constitution.
Seventh, the state Parliaments have substantial powers to legislate with
extra-territorial effect,5 ' and the assertion of "long arm" jurisdiction is not
restrained by federal or state constitutional guarantees of due process.52
None of these factors, save perhaps the sixth, characterizes the legal system
in the United States.

v. Edgar, 114 A.L.R. 1 (1993) (Building Societies Act 1986 (Vie.)). Canadian federal courts
operate without the benefit of an accured or pendent jurisdiction; HOGG, supra note 8, at
§ 7.2(b). The result must be the fragmentation of dispute resolution and contrary fact finding at
provincial and federal levels. As to the operation of estoppel doctrines in such cases, see Effem
Foods Pty. Ltd. v. Trawl Indus. of Austl. Pty Ltd., 36 F.C.R. 406 (1992), aff'd, 43 F.C.R. 510
(1993); see also Rocois Const. Inc. v. Dominion Redy Mix Inc. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 440; Campbell,
supra note 22, at 331-35 (addressing Canadian doctrine).
50. The position in the United States is outlined in CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§§ 12.1 to 12.3 (2d ed. 1994).
51. Union S.S. Co. of Austl. Pty Ltd. v. King, 166 C.L.R. 1, 13-14 (Austl. 1988). This is
not so in Canada and was not the position as generally understood in 1900 in the Australian
colonies. In Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1891] A.C. 455,458, the Privy
Council appears to have restricted colonial laws, or at least the criminal law, from extra-territorial
operation. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 2, at 354-55. The Canadian position is considered
later in this Paper.
52. Cf. Leeth v. Commonwealth of Austl., 174 C.L.R. 455 (Austl. 1992); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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SERVICE OF PROCESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Paragraph 51 (xxv) of the Australian Constitution was implemented by the
fifth statute passed by the first federal Parliament, the State Laws andRecords
Recognition Act 1901 (Cth). This statute, as amended by reliance upon the
ample power in relation to territories in section 122 of the constitution, is the
53
State and TerritorialLaws and Records RecognitionAct 1901 (Cth).
Of more importance for present purposes is the Service and Execution of
ProcessAct 1901 (Cth), replaced by the Service and Execution of Process Act
1992 (Cth). For nearly a century, this legislation has placed Australia in a
very different position to that in the United States and Canada with regard to
the first of the fields with which this paper is concerned, service of state
process and enforcement of state judgments.5 4
Article 4, section 1 of the United States Constitution empowers the
Congress to legislate to prescribe the "effect" in other states of the "public
acts, records, and [judicial] proceedings" of a state. The limited response by
the Congress to this investment of legislative authority, particularly with
reference to service of process and enforcement ofjudgments, has drawn much
adverse comment in United States literature.
An early and notable example is an article by Professor W.W. Cook. 55
The thesis of the learned author was that if a reasonable interpretation were
given to the powers of legislation granted to the Congress, it would support
the passage of legislation establishing a scheme similar to that found in
Australia in the 1901 Act. Professor Cook described the substance of the
Australian scheme as follows:
1. The civil and criminal process of each State can be served
throughout the Commonwealth. In the case of civil process, if the
defendant does not appear, and it is made to appear to the court
from which the writ issued, or to a judge thereof, that the writ was
personally served, or that reasonable efforts were made to effect
personal service on the defendant and that it came to his knowl-

53. Section 18 of this Act is as follows:
All public acts records and judicial proceedings of any State or Territory, if
proved or authenticated as required by this Act, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every Court and public office as they have by law or usage in
the Courts and public offices of the State or Territory from whence they are
taken.
54. The process of federal courts runs throughout Australia and the territories and their
judgments may be executed in like manner. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 18;
IndustrialRelations Act 1988 (Cth), § 374. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4; and, in Canada, Federal
CourtAct, R.S.C. § 55 (1985).
55. Walter W. Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
YALE L.J. 421 (1919).
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edge, the court may, on the application of the plaintiff, order that
the plaintiff shall be at liberty to proceed in the suit, provided it
falls within certain enumerated classes. Obviously it would not be
fair to permit a plaintiff to try any suit whatever in any court from
which he chose to obtain a writ of summons. The statute therefore
enumerates the classes of actions in which it seemed to the
Commonwealth Parliament fair to allow him to compel even a
non-resident of the state to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. A judgment duly rendered in one State may be enforced in other States
without suing on it and obtaining a new judgment. This method of
enforcing foreign judgments is well known to civil law countries. The
statute provides a simple method for registration of the judgment with
courts of similar jurisdiction in other states in which execution is
desired. After such registration the judgment has the force and effect
of a judgment of the court in which it is so registered. Due provision
is made to guard against abuses. The statute provides for the
registration not only of judgments for money but also for those which
either order or forbid the doing of acts.56

The result, as Professor Cook saw it, was that the Australian legislation
enabled litigants to enforce their legal rights throughout the Commonwealth
"with a simplicity and directness unknown to our law.""
Justice Jackson turned to the subject in 1944 in his well-known lecture
"Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution. 8 He
pointed to the role in Canada of the federal government in the appointment of
provincial as well as federal judges and to the existence in Canada and
Australia of a single national court of appeal in all cases and in all fields.5 9
That was an over-simplification because it did not allow for what was then, but
is no longer, the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to
entertain appeals brought directly from provincial and state courts, but the
general point was properly made that in Canada and Australia the court
structure was integrated to a degree that made conflict between courts much
less likely to occur than in the United States. Indeed, in a real sense the

56. Id. at 426-8 (citations omitted).
57. Id. A Canadian commentator has described the position in Australia as "curious,"
apparently because there is a shortage of reported cases construing the legislation. Swan, The
CanadianConstitution,Federalismand The Conflict of Laws, 63 CAN. BAR REV. 271, 282-283,
288 (1985). This paucity is a measure of the success of the legislation, not an indication that the
legal system is undeveloped.
58. Robert H. Jackson, FullFaith and Credit-TheLawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945).
59. Id. at 19-20.
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Canadian court structure is more closely integrated than that in Australia.
Speaking of the provincial superior courts, Justice Estey said in AttorneyGeneral of Canada v. The Law Society of British Columbia:
They cross the dividing line, as it were, in the federal-provincial scheme
of division of jurisdiction, being organized by the provinces under section
92(14) of the Constitution Act and are presided over by judges appointed
and paid by the federal government (sections 96 and 100 of the Constitution Act). 6°
Justice Jackson also referred to the Service and Execution of ProcessAct
1901 (Cth) as follows:
With provisions to safeguard against abuse and injustice, process of state
courts in appropriate classes of cases is authorized to be served anywhere
in Australia and their judgments may upon registration be executed in any
state.

61

This legislation has made it unnecessary in Australia to resolve issues of
domestic recognition and enforcement of process and judgments by reference
to the general imperative of section 118 of the Constitution. The significance
of the continuing contrast with the position in the United States 62 cannot be
over emphasized. It should be remembered that Australia has "but a limited
number of separate territorial jurisdictions or law areas and there is a basic
homogeneity or similarity in the common law and the statute law in force in
the various States and Territories. "63
The contrast with Canada is not so sharp, but in that federation an explicit
constitutional imperative of full faith and credit is lacking. However, change
is coming.
The common-law rules of private international law for the recognition of
foreign judgments, as understood by reference to English authority,' 4
provided the basis in Canada for the registration system in various provincial
legislation. In MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De Savoye' the Supreme Court

60. [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 327 (Can.). Note, however, the special position of inferior
provincial courts. HOGG, supra note 8, at 161-173, 184-200.
61. Jackson, supra note 58, at 20.
62. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261,292-293 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
63. Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41, 77-78 (Austl. 1988) (Mason, C.J.).
64. The leading English case was Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1 K.B. 302, 309. There, Lord
Justice Buckley said that there were five cases in which an English court would enforce a foreign
judgment on an action in personam. They included such connecting factors as citizenship,
residence when the action began, voluntary appearance and contractual submission.
65. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
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of Canada decided that the common law rules required reassessment of their
operation within Canada. A judgment of the courts of one province that did

not comply with the terms of the registration statute of a second province
might nevertheless now be entitled to recognition under the common law rules.
In particular, the court of the second province would ask whether there was
"a real and substantial connection" with the province in which the judgment
had been obtained. 6 The reasoning of the Supreme Court has since been
taken also as suggesting a more generous interpretation of the requirements for
registration in the provincial legislation. 7
Matters recently have been taken considerably further by the decision of
6
the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunt v. Lac d'Amiante du Quebec Dee. 1
The bill for what became the Business Concerns Records Act RSQ, c.D-12,
was introduced into the Quebec legislature in 1958, apparently with the object
of providing a local defence to the extraterritorial reach of United States
antitrust legislation. Similar legislation was in force in Ontario.69 The
immediate difficulty with the Quebec legislation was that on its face it applied
generally, including to proceedings in other Canadian provinces. In Hunt the
appellant, in British Columbia, sued certain Quebec companies, involved in the
production and distribution of asbestos.7' He sought, pursuant to the British
Columbia Rules of Court, discovery of documents by the Quebec companies
but the Quebec court granted orders preventing the respondent companies from
sending the documents out of Quebec. The Quebec statute prohibited the
removal from Quebec of documents relating to any business concern in Quebec

66. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 1108.
67. Acme Video Inc. v. Hedges & Retail Technologies (Video) Inc., 10 O.R.3d 503 (1992).
The necessary connection for Canadian common law now may be found between the territory and
one or more of the defendant and the plaintiff or the subject matter of the action. Where this
exists, the only question to be asked in the court of the second Province is whether the judgment
is Canadian. Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., 68 B.C.L.R.2d 394, 398-99 (1992); Exta-sea
Charters Ltd. v. Formalog Ltd., 55 B.C.L.R.2d 197,203 (1991); See generally, Vaughan Black,
Enforcementof Judgments andJudicialJurisdictionin Canada,9 Ox. J.L.S. 547 (1989); Woods,
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments between Provinces: The ConstitutionalDimensions
of MorguardInvestments Ltd., 22 CANADIAN Bus. L. J. 104 (1993).
68. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Can.). The writer is indebted to Madam Justice McLachlin for
drawing attention to this important decision of her court.
69. The Business Records Protection Act R.S.C., 1980, c. 56. Federal legislation of similar
character was enacted in Australia (Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act
1976 (Cth), now replaced by the Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cth)),
and in Canada (the Uranium Information Security Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 366, enacted
under the Atomic Energy Control Act R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19). The British legislation, the
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (U.K.) was considered by the House of
Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.), and the
Canadian legislationwas considered by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd.
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 39 (Can.).
70. Hunt, [1990] 4 S.C.R. 289 at 331.
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where the removal was sought pursuant to any requirement of a judicial
authority outside Quebec. The courts of British Columbia decided that the
conflict between the public policies of that province and of Quebec were to be
resolved by applying a doctrine of comity between provinces. This required
deference to the statute of Quebec.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec statute was "constitutionally inapplicable" to the present case. 7' That is to say, the respondent,
despite the Quebec law, was obliged to produce for inspection in British
Columbia the documents that it was obliged to discover under the law of
British Columbia regardless of whether the documents were located inside or
outside Quebec. This decision is authority for the following propositions. The
first concerns the legislative powers of the federal Parliament. As to this
Justice La Forest, who delivered the leading judgment, said:
I noted in Morguard ...that a number of commentators had suggested
that the federal Parliament had power to legislate respecting the recognition
and enforcement of judgments, and in my view that suggestion is well
founded. This issue is ultimately related to the rights of the citizen, trade
and commerce and other federal legislative powers, including that
encompassed in the peace, order and good government clause. But subject
to these overriding powers, I see no reason why the provinces should not
be able to legislate in that area, subject, however, to the principles in
Morguardand to the demands of territoriality ......
Second, and irrespective of the existence of federal legislation, the
integrating character of Canadian constitutional arrangements as they apply to
interprovincial mobility calls for the courts in each province to give full faith
and credit to the judgments of the courts of sister provinces; this "is inherent
in the structure of the Canadian federation, and, as such, is beyond the power
of provincial legislatures to override. "I Third, this does not preclude the
provinces from legislating with effect upon litigation in other provinces;
however, the provinces must respect "the minimum standards of order and
fairness addressed in Morguard."7 Fourth, the reference in Morguard to a
"real and substantial connection" to the forum that assumed jurisdiction and
gave judgment was not meant as a rigid test.75
Finally, it should be noted that in Hunt the constitutional doctrine of full
faith and credit operated in advance of the rendition of any final judgment in
the proceeding in British Columbia. The Supreme Court held that the

71. Id.at 45.
72. Id.at 42.
73. Id.at 41.
74. Id.
75. Hunt, 109 D.L.R.4th at 41.
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constitutional mandate, which required recognition of a judgment that had been
rendered, could not be avoided "by a preemptive strike." Justice La Forest
said:
The whole purpose of a blocking statute is to impede successful litigation
or prosecution in other jurisdictions by refusing recognition and compliance with orders issued there. Everybody realizes that the whole point of
blocking statutes is not to keep documents in the province, but rather to
prevent compliance, and so the success of litigation outside the province
that the province finds objectionable.76
Does this mean that compliance with the blocking orders made pursuant to
Quebec law would not be a lawful excuse for noncompliance with orders
whose ultimate authority rested in legislation of British Columbia? I will
return to this question at the end of this Paper.
In Australia, the legislative system for recognition and enforcement has
been taken further by the 1992 Act.77 Process issued in a state or territory
may be served in another state or territory.7" There is no requirement for
leave to serve ex juris and no limited list of cases where such service is
permissible.
The federal Parliament has thus placed a high degree of
confidence in the integrity of the state systems. However, the person served
may apply to the court of issue for an order staying the proceeding on the
footing that a court of another state or territory has jurisdiction to determine
all the matters in issue and is the appropriate court to determine them. In
reaching that conclusion, the court considers such matters as the places of
residence of the parties and of witnesses, the situation of the subject matter of
the proceeding, the financial circumstances of the parties, any agreement
between them as to the place of institution of the proceeding, the most
appropriate law to apply, and the existence of related or similar proceedings
elsewhere. A legal practitioner entitled to practice before a court in the place
of issue has a right of audience before the court hearing the application for
stay.79 If initiating process has been served under this system, a court of a
state or territory that is not the place of issue "must not restrain a party in the
proceeding from taking a step in the proceeding on the ground that the place
of issue is not the appropriate forum for the proceeding.'

76.Id. at 43.

77. Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth).
78. Id. §§ 5, 15.
79. Id. § 20.
80. Service and Execution of Process Act § 21, 1992 (Cth). Provision also is made for
initiating process in criminal proceedings (§§ 22-25), the service of subpoenas (§§ 28-46), the
service of process of state tribunals, that are authorized to take evidence on oath or affirmation
(§§ 47-80), and the execution of warrants (§§ 81-103). The 1992 Act applies to the exclusion
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When the initiating process issues out of the supreme court of a state or
territory rather than out of an inferior court, the provisions as to stay of

proceedings in section 20 of the 1992 Act do not apply because the situation
is governed by what is known as the cross-vesting scheme established by the
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) and corresponding
legislation in every state. The operation of the scheme has been analyzed by
Professor Johnson."' The scheme deals with vesting of jurisdiction and with
transfer of proceedings. Each state supreme court is vested by laws of the
other states with original and appellate jurisdiction with respect to "state
matters," although the intention of the legislation is that a proceeding should
be commenced in the appropriate state. The legislation also provides for the
transfer of proceedings between supreme courts. Transfer may be ordered not
only where a proceeding in one such court is related to a pending proceeding
in the other, but also when it is otherwise in the interests of justice that the
proceeding be transferred.82 No appeal lies from a decision to transfer.
Again, each component of the federation has evinced a high degree of
confidence in the procedures applying in the other supreme courts.83 This
may be compared with the institutional difficulties in the United States
attending the consolidation of multistate litigation in the courts of the states,
at a time when mass tort litigation involving numerous closely related lawsuits
"has reached staggering levels. "'
The enforcement of judgments is dealt with in Part VI of the 1992 Service
and Execution of Process Act (sections 104-109).'
Generally, upon
of state laws dealing with service of process in Australia, § 8(4). It should be noted that the long
arm provisions in the Supreme Court Rules of the several states were held to operate concurrently
and validly with the federal legislation of 1901. Flaherty v. Girgis, 162 C.L.R. 574 (Austl.
1987).
81. Herbert A. Johnson, Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectiveson Cross-vestingof Court
Jurisdiction,19 MELB. U. L. Rtv. 45 (1993).
82. In 1993, a mere 46 matters were transferred between supreme courts under this legislative
scheme. As Miss Bankhead would have said, there may be less to cross-vesting than meets the
eye. On the other hand, the Australian scheme may offer some guidance for the Uniform
Transfer Act proposed by the Conference on Uniform State Laws. Ellen A. Peters, State-Federal
JudicialRelationships:A Report From the Trenches, 78 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1889 (1992).
83. The legislation also provides its own choice-of-law rule. Where a supreme court is
exercising cross-vested jurisdiction in respect of a right of action arising under the written law
of another state, the court shall apply the law of that state. Service and Execution of Process Act
§ 11, 1992 (Cth). The considerable difficulties of interpretation to which section 11 gives rise
are discussed by Mr. C. Moore in his article Our FragmentedFederation:ForumBias andForum
Shopping in Australia, 22 FED. L. REv. 171, 186-91 (1994). The result of the operation of
section 11 may be to require in a given case the application of a lex causae that differs both from
that which would be required by the common law choice-of-law rules or by full faith and credit.
None of the recent High Court decisions has concerned cross-vested jurisdiction.
84. George T. Conway, III, The Consolidationof Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96
YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1987).
85. Provision also is made in Part VII (sections 110-126) for the enforcement offines imposed
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registration in the court of another state or territory, a registered judgment has
the same force and effect and gives rise to the same proceedings by way of
enforcement as if it had been given, entered or made in the court of registration.86 However, a court may enforce a judgment only to the extent that the
judgment is capable of enforcement in or by the court of rendition when the
enforcement proceeding has begun.8 The court of registration may delay
commencement of enforcement proceedings until a specified time or stay the
proceedings for a specified period, subject to conditions. The conditions may
relate to the prompt prosecution of an appeal against the judgment in the home
state or territory. 8
In light of the United States and Canadian experience, section 109 of the
1992 Service and Execution of Process Act is an important provision. If a
judgment is registered under subsection 105(1), the courts of the state or
territory of registration "must not, merely because of the operation of a rule
of private international law, refuse to permit proceedings by way of enforcement of the judgment to be taken or continued." The United States has fertile
fields of jurisprudence concerned with the enforcement of state judgments in
the courts of other states in the light of (1) the federal constitutional provisions
as to due process and full faith and credit, (2) the common law rules of private
international law as to recognition of foreign judgments, and (3) the operation
in a number of states of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act.9 The effect of section 109 of the Service and Execution of Process Act
is to make it clear that the legislation provides its own system for enforcement,
freed from common law restraints.
Also, the United States has a considerable body of authority concerned
with the cognate, but distinct, subject of constitutionally mandated res
judicata, including collateral estoppel. This is applicable when an unsuccessful plaintiff or its privies in an action in one state seek to sue again in a second
state.'
In Australia, the issues that arise with respect to concurrent or
successive actions in the courts of more than one state are dealt with by the
courts exercising their inherent powers as superior courts of record to deal
with abuses of process or by application of the doctrine of res judicata and its
various branches.

by courts of summary jurisdiction.
86. Service and Execution of Process Act of 1992 § 105.

87. Id. § 105(5).
88. Id. § 106.
89. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 75-83 (4th ed. 1986).
90. See id. § 75-76. Different issues arise as to the preclusive effects of state court judgments
upon proceedings in subsequent litigation in a federal court, for example, in a civil rights suit
under42 U.S.C. § 1983. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, § 8.10 (2d ed. 1994).
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I turn now further to consider the second aspect of full faith and credit
with which this paper is concerned. It is commonplace that in the operation
of full faith and credit upon statutes more difficult problems arise. Justice
Jackson said these problems were of "extraordinary complexity and delicacy. "91
CHOICE OF LAW AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN AUSTRALIA

One method of resolving competition between foreign or international
elements treats the full faith and credit provisions as a constitutional imperative
directly applying that which the common law choice of law principles of
private international law (as understood from time to time) identify as the lex
causae. That, as I have already indicated, in my view is not a conclusion
indicated by the constitutional text, at least in Australia.
Although the practice also is widespread in the literature, it appears odd
to discuss domestic and foreign choice of law doctrine interchangeably because
one differs fundamentally from the other. The principles of private international law involve matters of comity between the courts of the forum and those
of a foreign state. A federal constitution addresses the task of creating a body
politic, the state integers of which will not have international personality. The
states will, in terms of the federal constitution, hardly be treating each other
as foreign bodies politic. Their relationship is expressly and impliedly
provided for in that constitution. Secondly, the choice of law rules in their
international dimension require more flexibility than those in the domestic
sphere. They must cope with the lack of a shared federal legal system,
common culture, and political structure. The point is well made by Professor
Laycock: "Domestic choice of law need not be flexible enough to deal with
totalitarian states, revolutionary states, legally unsophisticated states, or states
with legal and cultural traditions fundamentally different from our own. " '
Yet, in substance, the doctrine currently prevailing with a majority of the High
Court represents the application in Australia to interstate choice of law of
principles designed to deal with such situations. This also is the case in the
United States, where much confusion appears to have been caused by treating
the federal choice of law questions the same as foreign choice of law.
In a recent quartet of decisions,93 the High Court has been concerned
with full faith and credit in the context of interstate torts. In Australia, the
prevailing common law choice of law rule laid down by the common law for

91. Jackson, supra note 58, at 11.
92. Laycock, supra note 33, at 260.
93. Goryl v. Greyhound Australia Pty. Ltd., 179 C.L.R. 463 (Austl. 1994); Stevens v. Head,
176 C.L.R. 433 (Austl. 1993); McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (South Australia) Pty. Ltd., 174
C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1991); Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41 (Austl. 1988).
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interstate torts is formulated as a modification of the rule in Phillips v.
Eyre.94 That formulation, by the majority of the High Court, is designed to
define more precisely the issues that are referred for determination to the lex
fori and the lex loci delicti. It is in the following terms:
A plaintiff may sue in the forum to enforce a liability in respect of a
wrong occurring outside the territory of the forum if - 1. the claim arises
out of circumstances of such a character that, if they had occurred within
the territory of the forum, a cause of action would have arisen entitling the
plaintiff to enforce against the defendant a civil liability of the kind which
the plaintiff claims to enforce; and 2. by the law of the place in which the
rise to a civil
wrong occurred, the circumstances of the occurrence gave
95
liability of the kind which the plaintiff claims to enforce.
To the American lawyer, it may appear curious that the Australian rule
does not involve any selection of "the proper law of the tort." Another
consequence of the national preservation of a rule first propounded in an action
brought in England regarding events in Jamaica is that the double actionability
requirement encourages plaintiffs to seek the most favorable forum. Forum
shopping has been encouraged by traditional tools of conflicts lawyers:
characterization, renvoi, the distinction between substance and procedure, and
the public policy reservation. These enable courts to apply the lex fori,
whatever the choice of law rules for the selection of the lex causae. However,
the approach adopted by the majority in McKain has been condemned as
"go[ing] a long way towards converting the Australian legal system into a
national market in which forum shoppers are encouraged to select between
competing laws imposing different legal consequences in respect of a single
occurrence."96

"[I]t is unclear why [such] forum shopping.., should strike us as
inherently distasteful while other types of jurisdiction shopping-from the
establishment of corporate residence to the flight for freedom by political
Some writers have decried any singlerefugees-give us little pause."'
minded focus on certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result because this
distracts attention, in particular, from the framing of choice of law rules that
seek to take into account and evaluate the content of competing substantive
laws.98 However, if the choice of law process should have regard to the

94. (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Eng. Q.B.).
95. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 110-11, quoted in McKain, 174 C.L.R.at 39.
96. Stevens, 176 C.L.R. at 442 (Mason, CJ.), 462 (Deane, J.).
97. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, 'Vestedness, 'and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1216
(1987).
98. See Friedrich K. Juenger, ForumShopping, Domestic and International,63 TULANE L.
REv. 553, 570-72 (1989); What's Wrong with Forum Shopping?, 16 SYDNEY L. REv. 5, 11
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substantive outcomes it produces, then a system of law that maximizes
recovery by plaintiffs by reason of their selection of the particular court in a
federation in which they bring their action for a wrong done to them in that
country is not necessarily a just system for defendants. Why should the
commission of a wrongful act in, for example, Australia produce different
legal consequences depending upon the court in which the action is brought to
trial? Is there then a national system of law?'
The treatment of section 118 of the Australian Constitution as applying
the choice of law rules to interstate disputes proceeds upon a particular view
taken of the nature of the common law in the federal system erected by that
constitution. This appears most plainly in the following passage from the
majority judgment in McKain:
To describe the States, as Windeyer J. once described them [Pedersen v.
Young (1964) 110 C.L.R. at p. 170], as "separate countries in private
international law" may sound anachronistic. Yet it is of the nature of the
federation created by the Constitution that the States be distinct law areas
whose law may govern any subject matter subject to constitutional
restrictions and qualifications. The laws of the States, though recognized
throughout Australia, are therefore capable of creating disparitiesin the
legal consequences attachedin the respective States to the same set offacts
unless a valid law of the Commonwealth overrides the relevant State laws
and prescribes a uniform legal consequence. That may or may not be
thought to be desirable, but it is the hallmark of a federation as distinct
from a union. Far from eliminating the differential operation of State
laws, section 118 commands that all the laws of all the States be given full
faith and credit: the laws of the forum are to be recognized as fully as the
laws of the place where the set of facts occurred. Section 118 would not
be obeyed by refusing recognition to the laws of a forum State and by
applying only the laws of the part of Australia in which the set of facts
occurred. A disparity in legal consequences attached to a set of facts
cannot be eliminated by refusing recognition to laws of the forum which
create the disparity. In our respectful opinion, section 118 does not
prescribe the selection of the lex loci delicti or other extraterritorial body
of law as the exclusive body of law governing liability for extraterritorial
torts. The selection of the applicable rules governing liability is the
function of the common law; section 118 provides for recognition by the
courts of the forum of the rules so selected." °

(1994). That view reflects a tradition whose most authoritativejudicial representative was Chief
Justice Stone. See Paul A. Freund, ChiefJustice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 1210, 1217, 1235-36 (1946).
99. See Brian R. Opeskin, 16 SYDNEY LAW REV.14, 22 (1994).
100. McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (South Australia) Pty. Ltd., 174 C.L.R. at 36-37 (Austl.
1992) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Of this passage the following nine comments may be made. First, the
third sentence, despite the use of "therefore" to suggest a logical link with
what precedes it, does not follow from the second, unless one gives a
particular meaning to the phrase "subject to constitutional restrictions and
qualifications;" yet, it is the identification of the governing constitutional
restrictions and qualifications that is the very task in hand.
Second, the fourth sentence assumes that a federation has certain
characteristics, some of which are so prominent as to be described as
"hallmarks." The Australian and United States Constitutions have specific
provisions dealing with full faith and credit. However, as indicated earlier in
this paper, they differ considerably in a number of relevant respects. The
Canadian Constitution has no express provision as to full faith and credit. All
would be recognized as significant examples of federations.1 1 Further, as
Professor Zines has demonstrated," °2 this is true even though the course of
decision has led to departures from the evident intent of those who drew the
Canadian and Australian Constitutions.
Fourth, section 117 of the Australian Constitution1 3 is an example of
an express prohibition that will disable some laws of the states from creating
disparities in legal consequences attached in the respective states to the same
set of facts. In Goryl v. Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd.1 4 the High Court
held that section 117 of the Constitution rendered section 20 of the Queensland
Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Qld) inapplicable to the claim of the
plaintiff, a New South Wales resident. This was because section 20 subjected
her, in Queensland, to a disability or discrimination that would not be equally
applicable to her if she were a Queensland resident. Mrs. Goryl, a resident
of New South Wales, was injured in New South Wales in a road accident
while traveling in a bus owned by a Queensland corporation and on a ticket
she had purchased in Queensland. She sued in a Queensland court alleging
negligence and breach of contract. Section 20 purported to limit her recovery
to an amount no greater than that which she might have recovered by action
in her place of residence, New South Wales. A New South Wales statute

101. Lord Haldane believed that the Canadian Constitution is not of "the true federal model"
because, unlike the Constitutions of the United States and Australia, the provinces do not retain
their powers subject only to those that are assigned to the federation: A-G for the Commonwealth
v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237, 252-253 (P.C. 1913). This view would now
find little favor.
102. LESLIE ZINE,

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH, 77-79 (1991).

103. "A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to
any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject
of the Queen resident in such other State." AUSTL. CONST. § 117; see Street v. Queensland Bar
Ass'n, 168 C.L.R. 461, 491-92,514, 546-48,560, 572-73,584-86 (Austl. 1989) (comparing the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution with AUSTL. CONST. § 117).
104. 179 C.L.R.463 (1994).
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restricted the damages recoverable by action there to lesg than those recoverable in Queensland. Section 20 applied irrespective of whether the accident
occurred within or outside Queensland and regardless
of whether the vehicle
05
or vehicles involved were insured in that state.1
The fifth comment concerns the statement in McKain that section 118
would not be obeyed by refusing recognition to the laws of a forum state and
by applying only the laws of the lex loci delicti because section 118 obliges
recognition of the laws of the forum as fully as the laws of the place where the
facts occurred. This may be compared with the significant dictum of Justice
Stone delivering the judgment of the Court in Alaska Packers Association v.
IndustrialAccident Commission of California.'6 His Honor said:
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without
regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that,
wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state
must be enforced in
7
the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.1
Sixth, on the other hand, the role given to section 118 in the final two
sentences of the above passage leaves the provision with little to do. Given
the nature of the federal structure to which I have earlier referred, would it not
follow from the circumstance that all states would be applying the same
common law in identifying the choice-of-law rules?
Seventh, section 118 undoubtedly has achieved some substantive
operation. In Breavington Chief Justice Mason said:
03
[Ifn Merwin Pastoral[Co. Pty Ltd. v. Moolpa Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd.]1
Rich and Dixon JJ. and Evatt J. considered that the section prohibited a
court of one State from refusing to give effect to a defence under the law
of another State, when the law of that other State was the proper law of
the contract then in question, on the ground that the law was contrary to
public policy considerations of the forum. This approach to the interpretation of the section accords with that given to Art. IV, section 1 of the
United States Constitution at that time. 0 9

105. Id.
106. 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). This has been said to put up "a straw man," because "[t]he

only reason to read the Clause in this absurd way is to escape the constitutional text altogether .

. . ."

Laycock, supra note 33, at 295-96. However, in the Queensland Court of Appeal, the

straw man has been treated as representative of United States doctrine: Rothwells Ltd. (In Liq.)
v. Connell, 119 A.L.R. 538, 548 (1993).

107. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
108. 48 C.L.R. 565, 577, 587-88 (Austl. 1933).

109. Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41, 81 (Austl. 1987).
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In that regard, his Honor referred to Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper."' Merwin was accepted in Breavington as good authority by Chief
Justice Mason and by Justices Wilson, Gaudron, Brennan, Deane, and
Dawson.'"
Eighth, it surely is an odd result in a federation in which recognition and
enforcement of judgments are so strictly controlled (in the sense that once a
judgment is obtained in a particular state the greatest efficacy is given it across
the nation) that the initial choice of forum and, thus, of the lex causae is left
so open to plaintiffs. Truly, the choice of the forum will determine the legal
consequences attaching to an act or omission that occurs in Australia. In a
country with an integrated economy and a mobile population, is this a proper
result of the high technique to be expected of a constitutional court?
The ninth comment is perhaps most important for the purposes of this
Paper. The passage from McKain"' contains the implicit choice of a
particular starting point for the consideration of the relationship between
choice-of-law rules as understood at common law and the full-faith-and-credit
provisions of the Constitution. Because the common law is the foundation of
the legal systems of every part of the federation, it provides the starting point
for considering the effect of the constitution. The assumption is that "[the
common law comes first and federal measures operate in and upon the legal
However, any exaltation of the
order ordained by the common law."'
common law in 1900 (or at any other date) as an ultimate or sufficient
constitutional foundation may be but an illustration of what Holmes discerned
in all men, "a demand for the superlative.""' In significant respects, the
common law has required (and still requires) qualification or abrogation by
statute to render it acceptable." 5 Further, invocation of "the common law"
in truth may be made on the footing that it does or should bear a close relation
to natural law. This is a matter of controversy." 6

110. 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
111. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 96, 116, 134, 150.
112. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
113. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 107 (Brennan, J.).
114. Oliver W. Holmes, NaturalLaw, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
115. The point is developed by Dennis Rose Q.C. in his paper JudicialReasonings and
Responsibilitiesin ConstitutionalCases, 20 MON. U. L. REv. 195, 212 (1994). See also D.A.
Smallbone, Recent Suggestions of an Implied 'Bill ofRights' in the Constitution, Consideredas
Partof a GeneralTrend in ConstitutionalInterpretation,21 FED. LAW REv. 254, 269 (1993);
Steven D. Smith, Idolatoryin ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 VA. L. REV. 583, 604-10 (1993).
116. See, e.g., B. Reynolds, NaturalLawversus Positivism:The FundamentalConflict, 13 Ox.
J.L.S. 441 (1993); ("Natural law involves belief. It involves the attempted imposition of values
on others and often the hijacking of the coercive nature of law to achieve this."); Holmes, supra
note 114, at 41 ("The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of
mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something
that must be accepted by all men everywhere.").
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The rather different starting point taken in these cases by Justice Deane
(with whose analysis Justices Wilson and Gaudron have broadly agreed) has
led to a quite different result.
His Honor has emphasized four propositions. The first is the operation
of the constitution as establishing a new national legal order embracing the
law-making activities of the Commonwealth and the states, where previously
there had been the Imperial Parliament and the legislatures of the colonies.
Second, the laws made by the Parliament and administered by the executive
exist independent of the awakening of the judicial power; "implicit in the
notion of separation of judicial power from legislative and executive powers
which represented a United States innovation in traditional British constitutional theory, is an assumption of the independent existence of laws by reference
to which the lawfulness of particular conduct can. . . be objectively and
contemporaneously ascertained."" 7 Third, the diversity jurisdiction created
by section 75(iv) of the constitution assumes the existence of a national law,
with Commonwealth and state elements, that can be ascertained and applied
by a court whose territorial jurisdiction extends indifferently to all parts of the
Commonwealth." 8 Fourth, it cannot have been the intention of the framers
of the constitution that, notwithstanding the identity of state laws as part of a
national system of law to be applied in the exercise of federal jurisdiction,
their content should be indefinite unless and until it was known in which
distinct court system a proceeding in respect of a particular dispute would be
brought.
The second proposition appears to be too widely expressed. There are a
significant number of valid federal laws in which the new federal right and
remedy are created in one breath, by providing that in certain specified
circumstances a person may take proceedings in a particular court to obtain a
specified remedy. 9
Further, legislation may create a new right in such a fashion that the
enjoyment of the right is conditioned upon the making of an order by a
specified court. An example is provided by section 31 of the Family Provision

117. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 122-123 (Deane, J.).
118. In Australia, diversity is between "residents" of different states, a term that has been
interpreted as excluding corporations. Australian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance
Society Ltd v. Howe, (1992) 31 C.L.R. 290 (Austl. 1992). The absence of a federal diversity
jurisdictionin Canada is a significantdistinctionbetween the Canadian and Australian federations,
even though both, unlike the United States, have a final court of general appeal. See Laskin,
"Comparative Constitutional Law-Common Problems: Australia, Canada, United States of
America," (1977) 51 A.L.J. 450, 458.
119. See, e.g., Arnotts Ltd. v. Trade Practices Comm'n (No.1), 21 F.C.R. 297, 303-04
(Austl. 1990); Vitzdamm-Jones v. Vitzdamm-Jones, 148 C.L.R. 383, 411, 425, 429 (Austl.
1981); Hooper v. Hooper, 91 C.L.R. 529, 535-36 (Austl. 1955); The King v. Commonwealth
Court of Conciliationand Arbitration; Exparte Barrett,70 C.L.R. 141, 155, 165 (Austl. 1945);
c.f. Commonwealth v. Evans Deakin Ind. Ltd., 161 C.L.R. 254, 265, 276-77 (Austi. 1986).
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Act 1982 (N.S.W.). This statute contains elaborate provisions under which the
Supreme Court of New South Wales may treat certain property as part of the
estate of a deceased person for the purpose of making family provision.
Section 31 provides for a release by a person of rights to make an application
in relation to a deceased person, but in terms such that the release is binding
only if the Supreme Court has given its approval. The High Court held that
the condition precedent, the fulfillment of which was necessary to render the
agreement of release effective, was one that might be fulfilled only by an order
of the Supreme Court under section 31. It followed that a federal court might
not make such an order in its accrued or pendent jurisdiction. 2 ' The Court
rejected the argument based upon Railway Co. v. Whitton... that the state
law had two operations, to create the right and to provide a forum, and that
the first was picked up in federal jurisdiction.
On a practical level, the cross-vesting legislation might enable the
supreme court of another state to exercise jurisdiction under section 31. That,
of course, is a statutory scheme. On the constitutional level (that with which
the reasoning of Justice Deane is concerned) legislation of this type may cause
a difficulty with the removal of the forum shopping activity by the imposition
of a revised choice of law rule directing all courts to apply the law of the
jurisdiction in the federation with which there is the predominant territorial
connection. However, the legislation of that jurisdiction may be so drawn as
to create rights that inherently are enforceable only in the courts of that home
state.
Justice Deane's views are most succinctly encapsulated in the following
passage in Thompson v. The Queen."m What was in issue in that case was
not choice of law in civil law, but locality in the criminal law. His Honor
said:
In truth, however, the local laws of the various States and Territories of
the Commonwealth cannot properly be treated as if they were discrete
systems of law of independent nations. They are the components of a
single national legal system: see Breavington v. Godleman [(1988) 169
C.L.R. at 120-122] and see, also, Sir Owen Dixon, "Sources of Legal
Authority," Jesting Pilate (1965), pp. 198-200. The Constitution itself
embodies that system of law. It assumes the substratum of the common
law upon which it was founded. It empowers the Commonwealth
Parliament to make laws with respect to the subject matters which it
enumerates, including laws for the government of the Territories. It
continues the constitutions and laws of the States to the extent that they are
consistent with both the Constitution itself and valid laws of the Common-

120. Smith v. Smith, 161 C.L.R. 217, 240-41 (AustI. 1986).
121. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872).
122. 169 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1989).
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wealth made pursuant to its terms. When inconsistency would otherwise
exist between the statutory laws of different elements of the Federation, the
Constitution itself resolves it: in the case of inconsistency between a
Commonwealth law and a State law, by the paramountcy of Commonwealth law under section 109; in the case of inconsistency between the
laws of different States, by the confinement of the operation of State laws
by reference to territorial (or predominant territorial) nexus under the
constitutional structure and the mandatory full faith and credit directive of
section 118. Subject to the Constitution itself and to valid statutory
provisions, the substantive law of Australia is the common law which
transcends internal State or Territorial boundaries and operates as "an
entire system" (cf. Sir Owen Dixon, "The Common Law as an Ultimate
Constitutional Foundation" Jesting Pilate.. .). So it is that, within the
body politic created by the Constitution, one set of facts will fall to "be
adjudged by only one body of law and thus give rise to only one legal
consequence, regardless of where in the Commonwealth the matter [falls]
for adjudication" (per Wilson and Gaudron J.J., Breavington [at 97-99]).
That one body of law is the law of the Australian nation which speaks with
a single voice as not as a babel of nine different Commonwealth, State or
Territory voices all speaking at the same time but saying different
23
things.
However, it is important to appreciate that Justice Deane's views do not
depend upon, and indeed may be independent of, any perceived operation of
section 118. The point appears in the following passage from his Honor's
judgment in Breavington v. Godleman:
[T]he constitutional solution of competition and inconsistency between
purported laws of different States as part of the national law must, where
the necessary nexus for prima facie validity exists, be found either in the
territorial confinement of their application or, in the case of multi-State
circumstances, in the determination of predominant territorial nexus. That
would have been the position under the provisions of the Constitution (in
particular, sections 106, 107 and 108) even if those provisions had not
included section 118.124 The presence of section 118 serves to make that
position plain." "
Justice Deane later said that "to give the words of section 118 their full effect
seems . . . to involve no more than allowing the section to perform its

123. Id. at 34-35 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
124. Sections 106, 107, and 108 of the Australian Constitution save state laws and constitutions
(but expressly subject to the constitution) and vest in state parliaments the powers of the colonial
legislatures, unless withdrawn from the states by the constitution.
125. 169 C.L.R. 41, 129 (Austl. 1988).
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intended function of confirming the integration of State legislative powers and
State laws within the national legal system which the Constitution established. "126
These remarks may be compared with what was said by Sir Owen Dixon
when speaking extra-judicially in 1943:
The colonies were and the States are distinct jurisdictions and the
enactments of their legislatures are confined in their territorial operation
because a State is a fragment of the whole. In other States the recognition
of its statutes depends upon the general common law principles governing
the extra-territorial recognition and enforcement of rights, as affected by
the full faith and credit clause. 127

How then to deal with competition or inconsistency between the laws of
different states? As indicated above, one method, which commends itself to
the present majority of the High Court, involves the relinquishment of the field
to private international law principles. Given the fundamental importance
found by their Honors in the common law in 1900 (or at least the presently
acceptable sections thereof) as the basis for the constitutional arrangements of
the country, it is not a surprising result. However, it was expressly rejected
by Justice Deane in the following terms:
So to apply private international law principles to resolve competition or
inconsistency between the laws of the Australian States seems to me,
however, to be objectionable on three overlapping grounds. It ignores the
significance of the federation of the former Colonies into one nation. It
frustrates the manifest intention of the Constitution to create a unitary
national system of law. It discounts the completeness of the Constitution
which, by the national legal structure which it establishes and by its own
provisions, itself either precludes or provides the means of resolving
28
competition and inconsistency between the laws of different States.
In particular, to apply the rule in Phillips v. Eyre, 29 or any variation
that gave substantive operation to the laws of the forum, would, as his Honor
saw it, preclude or undermine that unity of the national system of law and
deny the jurisprudence that it reflects. 3
From that conclusion, Justice

126. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 130.
127. Sources ofLegalAuthority, in JESTING PILATE, 198, 201 (1965) (emphasis added). The
writer is indebted to Mr. G. O'L. Reynolds of the New South Wales bar for drawing his attention
to this passage.
128. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 124-25.
129. (1870) L.R. 6 Q.V. 1 (Eng.Q.B.).
130. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 127-28.
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Deane has gone on to identify as the lex causae, at least in tort cases, the law
of the state with which there is the predominant territorial nexus. That law
31
will determine liability and calculation of damages.
In so doing, Justice Deane was aware of the resonance with the vested
rights theory. That, as a rationale for a common law choice of law rule for
Australian interstate torts, had been rejected by the High Court in 1951 in
Koop v. Bebb, 32 but Justice Deane asked whether the rejection of the vested
rights theory was consistent with the fundamental tenet, already referred to,
that in a federal system such as Australia there is a "basic distinction between
the objective existence or operation of law
on the one hand and its judicial
33
declaration or application on the other."
The position in this controversy taken by Chief Justice Mason is between
those taken by the other disputants, but the result is that his Honor does not
give section 118 an operation in choice of law for interstate torts. The Chief
Justice's position may be summarized as follows: (1) "Australia is one
country. . . and that the same significance or importance cannot be ascribed
to a person's conduct in moving from one State to another' as to an action of
a person moving from one country to another;" there should be avoided a
resolution of conflictual issues that give too much prominence to the law of the
forum because this "inevitably" will encourage forum shopping by plaintiffs.' 34 (2) Section 118 is not a choice of law provision; once the choice of
law is made by the common law, then full faith and credit must be given to the
law chosen. 35 The first part of this proposition does not necessarily lead to
the second. Section 118 may require effect to be given to the statutory law of
a fellow state that purports to reach subject matter in the forum, in the writer's
opinion, irrespective of the choice of law rules at common law. Given the
unitary nature of the common law in Australia, what would be the point of
mandating by section 118 the choice made by the common law? That is not
to deny the force of his Honor's suggestion that section 51(xxv), in using the
term "recognition throughout the Commonwealth," extends to authorize a
federal statutory revision of the choice of law rules. (3) Legislation will
provide a flexibility not found with a constitutional mandate. Thus,
If any provision in the Constitution is to be regarded as the source of a
solution to the inter-jurisdictional conflicts of law problems within
Australia, it is perhaps section 51(xxv). It is preferable that Parliament

131. Goryl v. Greyhound Austi. Pty. Ltd., (1994) 179 C.L.R. 463, 476 (Deane, Gaudron,
J.J.) (Austl. 1994).
132. 84 C.L.R. 629, 644 (Austl. 1951).
133. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 128.
134. Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433, 442 (Austl. 1993) (quoting Walton v. Walton, [1948]
V.L.R. 487, 489).
135. McKain v. R.W. Miller& Co. (South Austl.) Pty. Ltd. 174 C.L.R. 1, 31 (Austl. 1991).
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should provide a solution by an exercise of legislative power, if that be
legitimate, than that the Court should spell out a rigid and inflexible
approach from the language of section 118.136
(4) The "demolition" of the "vested rights" theory does not mean that the lex
loci delicti is not the primary or basic law to be applied. (5) Statutes of
limitation should be classified as substantive and available to be pleaded as a
good defence in circumstances where they form part of the law of the cause
applied by the forum according to its choice of law rules.' 37
With respect to the third point, the apprehended inflexibility of section
118, it has been pointed out that this by no means reflects the United States
full faith and credit doctrine.13 Further, Justice Deane himself returned to
the debate in McKain saying:
In a case where there is a substantive nexus with the territory of more than
one State, the determination of predominant territorial nexus may well
involve a discretionary weighing of competing factors, including considerations of what is fair and just, in which the rules of private international
law may be important by way of analogy. Any uncertainty or flexibility
involved in that process is, however, an aspect of the determination of the
content of the applicable law in the circumstances of the case. It does not
undermine or destroy the essential unity of the Australian legal system
since the reference point-i.e. predominant territorial nexus-will be same
regardless of the place within the Commonwealth in which the proceedings
39
are brought.'1
The selection in the High Court judgments of rather different starting
points has led to a different destination in determining the relationship between
full faith and credit in the Australian Constitution and the choice of law rules
of the common law. It is worth noting that the differences of opinion as to the

136. Breavington, 169 C.L.R. at 83. Professor Brainerd Currie was of the view that the courts
are not equipped to resolve the conflict where each of the states involved has a "legitimate
interest" in the application of its own law and that such a function was for legislation under the
'effect" clause of the full faith and credit provision: The Constitutionand The Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests And The JudicialFunction, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 188, 271-73 (1963).

137. McKain, 174 C.L.R. at 26-27. It should be noted that Justice Deane reached the same
conclusion on this issue. Id. at 51-52. In the United States, the prevailing doctrine is that the
application by the forum of its own statute of limitations to claims governed by the laws of other
states is consistentwith the requirements of full faith and credit and due process. See Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
138. Opeskin, ConstitutionalDimensions of Choice of Law in Australia, 3 P.L.R. 152, 179
(1992). I return to this matter later in this Paper.
139. 174 C.L.R. at 53.
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nature of the common law in the federal system have this much in common;
they reflect differing views of an undoubted common law unity that does not
exist in the United States and so cannot easily guide the evolution of full faith
and credit doctrines in that country.
The recent Australian decisions have concerned tort actions in which there
is a well-developed, if, as the cases illustrate, not well-settled, body of choice
of law doctrine. That circumstance assisted the conclusion of the majority that
section 118 is not a choice of law provision. However, it did not focus
attention upon the constitutional text.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE LAWS

The High Court has not been presented with cases in which a statute
creates a new species of right or obligation; in which the law of one or more
states purports to have a direct operation in the territory of a third; and all
affect by their terms or in their operation the same persons, transaction, or
relationships. The existence of such a class of case was noted in the joint
judgment of all members of the High Court in PortMacDonell Professional
Fishermen'sAssociation Inc. v. State of South Australia.40 The High Court
also has not been presented with cases where the statutes of one or more states
abrogate or modify common law rights and duties and, by their terms or in
their operation, affect the same persons, transactions, or relationships, but do
so by connecting factors that do not provide any lex causae reflecting the
common law choice of law rules.
Here, there will be conflict in the constitutional sense. It is not easy to
see how the conflict is to be resolved by ignoring section 118 and relying on
the decisions, given in a different context, that section 118 is not a choice of
law provision. On the other hand, the scheme of the constitution as seen by
Justices Wilson, Deane, and Gaudron provides resolution of inconsistency
between state laws. Thus, one must ask whether the last has been heard of the
doctrine of which they seek acceptance.
In Rothwells Limited (In Liq.) v. Connell4' the question was whether
a deed executed in Western Australia, not stamped with duty in accordance
with the law of that state but stamped in Queensland was inadmissible in a
Queensland court by reason of noncompliance with the law of the other state.
The Queensland law made the deed admissible in evidence and available for
all purposes. The Queensland Court of Appeal concluded that even if the
proper law of the deed was that of Western Australia, the Queensland

140. 168 C.L.R. 340, 374 (Austl. 1989).
141. 119 A.L.R. 538 (Austl. 1993). Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court
(Brennan, Dawson, Gaudron, J.J.) on 13 May 1994.
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legislation
prevailed over an inconsistent statutory provision of another
42
state.1
Judge of Appeal, Justice McPherson took the recent High Court
authorities as deciding generally that section 118 leaves it to the common law
principles of private international law to determine the choice between
conflicting laws. 143 It should, however, be noted that it was not submitted
that by its own terms the law of Western Australia purported to apply outside
that state. There was, therefore, in Queensland, no conflict with the laws of
that state in any constitutional sense. Therefore, in the writer's opinion,
Western Australia sought no faith and credit elsewhere for its law.
In Canada, the scope for conflict in this constitutional sense between the
laws of the provinces is diminished by a view of extra-territorial competence,
which is narrower than prevailing Australian doctrine, that the requirement for
a relevant connection between the state and the circumstances on which the
state legislation operates should be liberally applied and that even a "remote
and general" connection between the subject matter of the legislation and the
state will suffice. 1" On the other hand, speaking of the Canadian position,
Professor Hogg has said: "As a general proposition, it is plain that a province
may not regulate extraprovincial activity. What is often difficult is distinguishing extraprovincial activity from intraprovincial activity, and distinguishing the
incidental effects of a statute from its pith and substance."1
Thus, in InterprovincialCo-operatives Ltd. v. The Queen 46 the majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada held that Manitoba could not create a
statutory right of action for damages against out-of-province firms that
introduced pollutants into rivers eventually flowing into Manitoba, thereby
destroying Manitoba fisheries. 147 However, Justice McIntyre explained an
associated doctrine in Churchill Falls (Labrador)Corp. v. Newfoundland
(Attorney General):
Where the pith and substance of the provincial enactment is in relation to
matters which fall within the field of provincial legislative competence,
incidental or consequential effects on extra-provincial rights will not render
the enactment ultra vires. Where, however, the pith and substance of the
provincial enactment is the derogation from or elimination of extraprovincial rights then, even if it is cloaked in the proper constitutional
form, it will be ultra vires. A colorable attempt to preserve the appear-

142. Id.
143. Id. at 548.
144. Union S.S. Co. of Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. King 166 C.L.R. 1, 14 (1988) (a joint judgment

of all members of the High Court).
145. HOGG, supra note 8 at 323.
146. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477.
147. Id.
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ance of constitutionality in order
to conceal an unconstitutional objective
48
will not save the legislation.1
It may be noted that in Hunt 49 the Canadian Supreme Court, having decided
that the Quebec statute was constitutionally inapplicable because it violated the
principles of Morguard,50 found it unnecessary to consider whether that
statute was unconstitutional because, in pith and substance, it related to a
matter outside Quebec.151
Issues that the Australian and Canadian courts have yet to face have been
litigated in the United States. It is appropriate now to turn to the United States
experience.
THE UNITED STATES, CHOICE OF LAW, CONFLICT OF LAWS

AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

In the Australian cases, the stance has been taken that the teaching of the
United States jurisprudence is, first, that "vested rights" theories have been
consigned to history, and, further, that the prevailing doctrines of full faith and
credit exhibit inflexibility. Neither proposition accurately reflects the situation
in the United States.
The practical question with which much of the United States full faith and
credit learning has been concerned is whether the court of the forum state must
entertain and allow recovery on an action admittedly created by the statutory
law of another state and admittedly not governed by the substantive law of the
forum, including the forum's choice of law rules. Involved in such cases is
the further question of the constitutional impact of full faith and credit doctrine
upon what otherwise would be the operation of the "vested rights" theory of
choice of law. The same is true where what is relied upon in the forum state
is a substantive defence established by the statutes law of another state.
In its classical (or primitive) form, the vested rights theory, exemplified
in the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws,'52 fixed upon the premise that
a right vested under the law of the place of the last event necessary to assert
the right. In Pozniak v. Smith, " after referring to the attraction of the place
of the tort as providing the lex causae, Justice Mason continued:

148. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, 332.
149. Hunt v. Lac d'Amiante du Quebec Lte, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 331.
150. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
151. Hunt, [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 331.
152. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLicr OF LAWS §§ 311-31 (1934). Professor Joseph
H. Beale was the reporter.
153. 151 C.L.R. 38 (Austl.,1982).
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In saying this I do not indorse the theory that the act complained of
gives rise to an obligation by the lex loci delicti and that this obligation
follows the actor with a result that it may be enforced against him
wherever he is found. This theory, which seems to have originated with
Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre, was elaborated by Holmes J. in Slater v.
Mexican National Railroad Co. and Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Brown and by Reynolds J. in New York CentralRailroad Co. v. Chisholm,
and adopted by Cardozo J. in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,
though rejected by Judge Learned Hand in Guinness v. Miller. The theory
was discarded by Dixon, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. in Koop. They
said "courts applying the English rules of private international law do not
accept the theory" and went on to say:
English law as the lex fori enforces an obligation of its own
creation in respect of an act done in another country which would
be a tort if done in England, but refrains from doing so unless the
act has a particular character according to the lex loci actus.
His Lordship, speaking of the theory, said "It can hardly be
restored now by anything less than a revolution in thought." 54
In Breavington Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan, Dawson and Toohey
referred with apparent approval to what they regarded as the demise of the
vested rights theory.'
However, as earlier indicated in this Paper, Justice
Deane took a different view. Further, in their joint judgment, Justices Wilson
and Gaudron said:
Although acceptance of the 'vested rights' theory involves the consequence that liability is determined according to the law of the place of the
wrong, the rejection of that theory does not necessarily entail the
consequence that liability or the extent thereof is co-extensive with the
liability which would arise if the act giving rise to the action had been
committed within the law district of the forum. Even accepting that the
obligation is one created by the law of the forum, it does not follow that
the nature or extent of the obligation should be determined in disregard of
the law of the place where the tort was committed. 5 6
Associated with the legal realist movement and perhaps with other
philosophies under the New Deal was the rejection of vested rights as overly
conceptualist (an odd term of criticism by one thinker of another) in favor of
the implementation of full faith and credit by reference to the judicially
perceived governmental interests involved. Which was the better law? 57
154. Id. at 52-53 (citations omitted).
155. Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41, 72, 110, 144, 160.
156. Id. at 90.
157. In some states, there was no departure from the vested rights theory.
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Thus, one is brought inevitably to what was said and decided in Alaska
Packers Association v. IndustrialAccident Commission of California.5"
It
is necessary to refer briefly to the dreary facts of the case. The California
worker's compensation law provided compensation for injuries sustained out
of the state only for workers who were residents in California at the time of
the injury and whose contract of employment was made there.'59 At the
time the appellant injured worker contracted for employment, the California
Supreme Court had held in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission'60 that the legislation was in conflict with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause because it granted to the citizens of California a privilege
withheld from those of other states, and that the effect of the Constitution was
to invalidate the discrimination.' 6' As a result of this invalidation of the
restriction in favor of residents the statute was interpreted as extending its
benefits to nonresident workers, including aliens. 6 Further, the Supreme
Court of California had held that the legislation of the then territory of Alaska
was so drawn that the California Industrial Accident Commission could not
apply and administer the Alaska act. 63 The facts of Alaska Packers must
be understood against this background.
In Alaska Packers a nonresident alien, by a written contract executed in
San Francisco, agreed to work for the appellant in Alaska during the salmon
canning season.1' The appellant was obliged by the contract to transport the
worker to Alaska and at the end of the season to return him to San Francisco
where he was to be paid his stipulated wages. The worker was injured in the
course of his employment in Alaska."
The California statute gave the
respondent Commission jurisdiction in respect of the injury. The statute also
provided that no contract would exempt the employer from liability for

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 823 (Ala. 1991), the Supreme Court
of Alabama retained the status quo, saying that "[t]he newer approaches to choice of law
problems are neither less confusing nor more certain than the traditional approach" and citing
decisions of at least twelve states (including South Carolina in Algie v. Algie, 261 S.C. 103, 198
S.E.2d 529 (1973)) to the same effect as those of Alabama. See Elizabeth Webb, Note, Fitts v.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.: Alabama'sStrongholdAgainstthe Second Restatement,
44 ALA. L. REV. 599 (1993).
158. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
159. Id. at 538.
160. 192 P. 1021 (Cal. 1920).
161. Id. at 1026.
162. See id. at 1029.
163. See Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. 34 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Cal.
1934) (per curiam). The significance of the circumstance that Alaska was then but a federal
territory, not a sister state of California, is discussed by Professor Currie, supra note 136, at 26465.
164. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 538 (1935).
165. Id.
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compensation fixed by the statute."
While the contract had recited an
election by the worker to be bound by the worker's compensation law of
Alaska, the worker applied for and received an award from the Commission
in California. 67
The issue was not one of a choice between the law of California or that
of Alaska. Still less was there a conflict between the reach of the two laws.
The issue was whether California law would be applied to the worker's claim
or whether the worker would be denied relief in that state.168 The immediate
issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the California
court, on review from the Commission, had failed to accord the Alaska law
full faith and credit by refusing to allow it as a defence to the award by the
Commission. The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of full faith
and credit in refusing that defence. Speaking of California, Justice Stone said:
"Its interest is sufficient to justify its legislation and is greater than that of
Alaska, of which the employee was never a resident and to which he may
never return." 1 69 The governmental interest of California had been formulated as follows by the State Supreme Court:
[Tihe policy of the act.., is to charge to the industry those losses which
it should rightfully bear, and to provide for the employee injured in the
advancement of the interests of that industry, a certain and prompt
recovery commensurate with his loss and, in so doing, lessen the burden
of society to care for those whom industry has deprived,70 either temporarily
or permanently, of the ability to care for themselves.
Significantly, Justice Stone pointed out that the California law did not purport
to have any extra-territorial effect in the sense of undertaking to impose a rule
for foreign tribunals. Nor did the Court decide that the Alaska statute imposed
any rule for the tribunals of California; to the contrary, the Alaska Act
provided that no action was to be brought under it in any court outside Alaska,
save where it was impossible to serve the defendant within Alaska. It was
conceded that it was possible to do so in this case.
Therefore, there must be much to be said for the proposition that there
was no conflict between the two statutes in the sense that they competed in
concurrent application to the claim made in California. The Supreme Court
did not decide what the result would have been if the worker had sought

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 549-50.
170. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Conm'n, 34 P.2d 716,720 (Cal. 1934) (per

curiam).
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compensation in Alaska and contended that full faith and credit required effect
to be given by way of defence to the law of California.
The purpose of the reliance in California on the Alaska law as a defence
was to invoke the vested rights theory as it had been developed as a choice of
law rule at common law. If accepted, the result would have been that the only
rights of the worker in respect of his injury had vested in Alaska, were
contained in the law of Alaska, and had followed him to California, but were
of no use there. Translated into constitutional terms, the question, as Justice
Stone saw it, was whether California was required to give full faith and credit
to the Alaska law, thereby denying the application in its own courts of the
California statute, enacted in pursuance of the domestic policy of California.
The Supreme Court decided that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
require California to deny enforcement of its own laws in its own courts.
Professor Currie preferred to treat the case as one in which the interest of the
forum was so dominant as to present a case of a false conflict, even though
there were facts that provided contacts with the other state. 71 However,
Justice Stone said that the full-faith-and-credit issue was to be determined "by
appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale
of decision according to their weight,"1 suggesting that the issue is not
whether the forum is shown to have sufficient governmental interest, but
whether that interest predominates.
The existence of a conflict was more readily apparent in Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission," in which the
opinion of the court also was delivered by Justice Stone. Under Massachusetts
law, insured employers were deemed to have waived their rights of action "at
common law or under the law of any other jurisdiction. "174 This was treated
as an attempt by that state "to project its laws across state lines so as preclude
the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within
it."" The California law stipulated that no "contract, rule, or regulation"
would exempt an employer from liability under California law. 176 California
was not obliged by full faith and credit to allow the Massachusetts law as a
defence to a claim under California law.
Likewise, in Carroll v. Lanza 7 7 the Missouri worker's compensation
statute was "in terms applicable and exclusive as to the rights of workmen
injured outside that State while under Missouri employment contracts."'

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Currie, supra note 136, at 201-14; Leflar, supra note 89, § 92.
Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547.
306 U.S. 493 (1939).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 499.

177. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
178. Id. at 422 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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However, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Arkansas, the state
where the injury was sustained, to allow the law of Missouri to bar an action
in Arkansas to recover common-law damages.7 9
The governmental interest analysis has been criticized as foreign to the
traditional objectives of choice of law doctrine. It has been said that the forum
uses private international law rules, including those of choice of law, not in
order to serve its own goals, but rather in search of justice in the relations of
individuals so that the interests at stake in a conflicts case are not governmental so much as private.'
It might also be said that in this field the principles are developed by the forum as a matter of enlightened self-interest. Such
considerations serve to point ouit the confusion of thought that arises from
translating choice of law into the analysis of constitutional full faith and credit.
In a federal system, freedom of state action is constrained by the union
between them, and a fundamental problem is the reconciliation or resolution
of the conflicting interests of the several states.'
In a country such as
Australia where there is a uniform common law, those interests are represented solely by conflicting statutes.
In Hughes v. Fetter" the Supreme Court decided in the affirmative
what Justice Black called the narrow question of whether the forum,
Wisconsin, was obliged by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
to open what otherwise would have been the closed doors of its courts to a
cause of action created by an Illinois wrongful death act.8 3 It has been said
that this is the last state choice of law decision invalidated by the Supreme
Court.1'4
As has been pointed out earlier in this Paper, to treat each state as
required by full faith and credit to apply the law of the others is absurd. To
let each state always apply its own law denies the giving of full faith and credit
in any substantive sense. The question then is one of ascertaining those
occasions when the forum is bound to apply the law of another state and those
when it is not so bound. Thus, Australia Constitution section 118 assumes the
existence of constitutional conflict rules without specifying their content.

179. Id. at 413-12. Other authorities in which the forum applied its own substantive law when
clearly in conflict with the statute of another state are collected in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter. See id. at 416.
180. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 CoLUM. L. REv.
772, 965-66 (1983).
181. See Jackson, supra note 58.
182. 341 U.S. 609 (1951). But c.f. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
183. Id. at 611, 613-14.
184. Laycock, supra note 33, at 257. However, the learned author also contends that there
are many decisions of the lower courts that, upon analysis, show that "governmental interest"
never fully displaced all variants of vested rights theory.
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The governmental interest doctrine was such an attempt, but there were
a number of difficulties with it. First, Professor Currie himself did not favor
the courts as the medium for determining of any closely balanced dispute as
to where the greater weight of governmental interest lies between the laws of
the forum and another state or states. Second, the role of federal government
has expanded in all three federations, and the area for predominant or even
significant state concern in many areas of social policy has correspondingly
diminished. Rival state interests now exist at best under the brooding
omnipresence of the greater federal interest. Third, as the background to the
Alaska Packers case illustrates, the governmental interest theory tended to
focus attention upon and give weight to the parochial interests of the forum.
In the United States, this idea immediately suggests conflict with the operation
of the Privileges and Immunity Clause, which must be read with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause so that the latter is not read in a way that clashes with the
objectives of the former. "ss
Section 117 of the Australian Constitution forbids the subjection of the
resident of one state to any disability or discrimination in another that would
not be equally applicable to a resident of that other state. Thus, in respect of
an action brought in State A by a resident of State B, the law of State A may
not validly limit the amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff to that
which would have been recoverable if the plaintiff had sued in State B. The
Australian Constitution requires this result, notwithstanding the fact that the
cause of action arises out of the defendant's use of a vehicle registered in State
A where the law creates a cooperative insurance welfare scheme financed by
premiums collected by State A residents for the benefit of plaintiffs who, on
the whole, are residents of that state.' 6
The application in such a case of the theory of national legal structure
advanced by Justice Deane would require that the damages be calculated in
accordance with the law of State B, where the cause of action arose, not under
the law of the forum." 7 Accordingly, a law of the forum limiting damages
in accordance with the law of the plaintiff's state of residence at the time of
the accident will be valid only where the accident occurs in the forum. Even
though the accident occurs in State B, if State A "tops up" damages recoverable in its courts by its residents for accidents in State B, but denies this to a
plaintiff who is a resident of State B, section 117 operates to free that plaintiff
from the requirement of residence in State A. Justices Deane and Gaudron
attribute this result to the constitutional proposition that damages are to be
assessed by the law of the place of the accident, rather than the forum, in
conjunction with the further constitutional mandate against discrimination

185. Laycock, supra note 33, at 261-88.
186. Goryl v. Greyhound AustI. Pty. Ltd., 179 C.L.R. 463 (Austl. 1994).
187. Id.
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based on residence. 8 8 However, upon the hypothesis that the lex loci delicti
governs the calculation of damages regardless of the forum in which the claim
is brought or the state of residence of the plaintiff, there remains a basic
question: How does the availability of top-up damages under the lexfori avail
a plaintiff whose injury was sustained outside the forum? Why does section
117 apply to free the plaintiff from a residence requirement when the result is
to provide the plaintiff with damages calculated other than by the lex loci
delicti? Surely, if on its face the law had conferred the top-up benefit
irrespective of residence, on the national legal structure hypothesis it would
not validly have supplemented the damages provided by the lex loci delicti.
Finally, the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction in the United States
and Australia, with its objective of avoidance of feared state parochialism,
suggests that conflicts between state laws are not, within the federal constitutional structure, 'to be resolved by preferring the governmental interest of one
state to that of another.
The admonitions of Professor Currie against involvement by the courts in
the evaluation of finely balanced conflicting governmental interests have been
reflected in the course taken by the United States' decisions in the last forty
years. Broadly, the result has been to treat the full faith and credit mandate
as only infrequently requiring the forum to defer to the conflicting law of
another state. What one might call the choice-of-law decision of each state
thereby is respected. That result in terms of the concern of the High Court of
Australia favors forum shopping and produces great uncertainty. Full faith
and credit is anything but inflexible. The situation was summed up as follows
in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,'89 in which Justice Scalia said that:

[S]ince the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the
case under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply
either the law of one State or the contrary law of another .... ("[I]n
many situations a state court may be free to apply one of several choices
of law").19°
The result in Shutts' 91 was perhaps an exception to the general trend.
There it was held that the Kansas court's application of the law of the forum
to every claim in the case was sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed
constitutional limits under the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause"9 because of the lack of interest of Kansas in most of the
claims involved and the putative conflicts with the law of a number of states
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 477-80 (Deane, Gaudron, J.J.).
486 U.S. 717 (1988).
Id. at 727 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985)).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
Id. at 822-23.
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with a connection to the litigation, especially Texas and Oklahoma. 93 The
litigation concerned class actions involving gas leases between non-Kansas
residents. The leases were situated outside Kansas. In reaching its decision,
the Supreme Court applied the now current orthodoxy in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague. "4 In announcing the decision in Shutts, Judge Rehnquist
described the Allstate decision as follows:
In that case we were confronted with two conflicting rules of state
insurance law. Minnesota permitted the "stacking" of separate uninsured
motorist policies while Wisconsin did not. Although the decedent lived in
Wisconsin, took out insurance policies and was filled there, he was
employed in Minnesota, and after his death his widow moved to Minnesota
for reasons unrelated to the litigation, and was appointed personal
representative of his estate. She filed suit in Minnesota courts, which
applied the Minnesota stacking rule.
The plurality in Allstate noted that a particular set of facts giving rise
to litigation could justify, constitutionally, the application of more than one
jurisdiction's laws. The plurality recognized, however, that the Due
Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided modest
restrictions on the application of forum law. These restrictions required
"that for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. "195
It is in this setting that there has been in the last decade renewed interest
by scholars in the United States in territorial connections as a means of
guiding the courts from what one commentator has described as "the apparent
end of all meaningful limits"' 96 on state forum choice of law, as in Allstate.
One learned author, after referring to the current mechanics of interstate
litigation as a "forum shopping system," says:
A number of factors converge to make things easy for plaintiffs. These
include relaxed standards of personal jurisdiction, the general obligation
of states to provide a forum, choice of law theories that encourage the use
of forum law, and minimal scrutiny by the Supreme Court of state choice
of law decisions ....

193. Id. at 816.
194. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). The result in this decision has been described as
"maddeningly unresponsive to virtually any important question concerning the theoretical aspects
or practical consequences of the choice-of-law revolution." Korn, supra note 180, at 797.
195. 472 U.S. at 818.
196. Laycock, supra note 33, at 257.
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•.. The plaintiff's shopping will consist generally of a twofold search for
a jurisdiction with a favorable substantive law and a choice of law theory
that will point to the application of that law. 99
Earlier in this Paper, I referred to the apparent impact of Professor Dane's
paper upon the reasoning of Justice Deane and to the writings of Professors
Brilmayer, Laycock, and Korn. They are but four of the many writers in the
field who discount the effectiveness of the earlier search for the better law by
interest analysis.1 98
Consequently, the interpretation of full faith and credit as regards
conflicting statutes by means of interest analysis through judicial decision has
run into sand and left forum choice of law greatly strengthened. In reaction
to this shift, a growing measure of scholarly opinion favors the direction taken
in Australia by the minority in recent Australian High Court decisions. The
situation in the United States, however, is anything but clear. The United
States is in "an era when the diversity among the States in choice-of-law
principles has become kaleidoscopic."' 99
CONCLUSION-WHITHER CANADA?
The foregoing discussion may only confirm to Canadians that they may
not after all have been greatly prejudiced by the absence of an express full
faith and credit provision from their constitution. The most readily apparent
need for such a provision concerns recognition and enforcement of judgments.
The effect of Huni3 is to give constitutional force to the remolding of the
common law by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard.20 ' No doubt,
the existing provincial registration regimes will develop over time to reflect
that adjustment.

197. George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't A Conservative
Court ProtectDefendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 673-74 (1993) (citations omitted).
198. For a convenient collection of references to the publications by both the territorial school
and those disaffected with the New Deal choice of law revolution, see Dane, supra note 97, at
1191 n.1; Laycock, supra note 33, at 253-54 nn.19-33.
199. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concerning
transfer between Federal District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). In Australia, the federal
courts are not bound to a particular district; a judge may hear a trial partly at one registry and
partly at another. Section 48 of the FederalCourt ofAustraliaAct 1976 (Cth) empowers a judge
at any stage of a proceeding to direct that the proceeding or any part of it be conducted or
continued "at a place specified in the order."
200. Hunt v. Lac d'Amiante du Quebec Ltee., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Can. 1993).
201. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.).
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The requirement of a real and substantial connection with the province in
which the judgment has been obtained may be compared with the determination of predominant territorial nexus as determinative of the law ensuring that
the legal consequences attaching to an act or omission that occurs in a
federation are the same, regardless of the forum in which the federation
proceedings are brought. I refer there, of course, to the implications a
minority of the High Court, notably Justice Deane, have drawn from the
Australian Constitution as, in effect, indicative of a constitutional choice-oflaw rule. May not this skein of thought suggest the approach of an area
awaiting further development after Morguardand Hunt? This approach revises
common-law-choice of law rules to reflect a national federal legal structure in
which there is no directly mandated full faith and credit.
In Grimes v. Cloutier"° Justice Morden referred, as had Justice Mason
in Pozniak v. Smith, 3 to the passage in the judgment of Justice Willes in
Phillips v. Eyre2' 4 that suggests the importance of the lex loci delicti and
gives inferential support to the vested rights or territorial theory of liability in
tort. Justice Morden also referred to what might be called federal considerations. The plaintiff, a resident of Ontario, before suing in that province in
respect of an injury she suffered in Quebec, had received the benefits available
to her under the Quebec statutory scheme that relieved the defendants, Quebec
residents, of further civil liability. His Lordship held that for Ontario to
ignore the Quebec legislation would be an "officious intermeddling" with the
legal concerns of Quebec.2'5
Further, whatever may be the necessary adjustment in a federation to the
choice-of-law rules as otherwise understood at common law, some mechanism
is necessary to deal with conflicts in the true sense between laws of two or
more states or provinces, even in the absence of an express constitutional
provision. Sir Owen Dixon foreshadowed the process of implication upon
which largely rests the doctrine now espoused by the minority of the High
Court of Australia. Does this point to a path for the next steps in Canada after
Hunt? Indeed, while the result in Hunt is not expressed in such direct terms
by the Canadian Supreme Court, some of that doctrine may be involved in it.
The Quebec law was constitutionally inapplicable in the courts of the second
province.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to produce in British
Columbia copies of the documents in question, holding that the Quebec statute
should be read "as not applying" to the other provinces. The Quebec
Provincial Courts had granted various orders preventing the respondents from

202.
203.
204.
205.

69 O.R. (2d) 641, 647 (1989).
151 C.L.R. 38 (Austl. 1982).
(1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at 28.
Id. at 660.
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sending the documents out of Quebec. The Courts of British Columbia had
refused orders compelling production. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed
the appeal from British Columbia. The reason given by the Supreme Court
was that the Quebec "blocking law" sought to strike pre-emptively at the
judgment that was sought in British Columbia.
But the effect of what was decided was to require the orders made under
authority of Quebec law to yield to orders now made under authority of the
law of British Columbia. Was there not a conflict of laws in the constitutional
sense that was resolved by full-faith-and-credit doctrine?
The result in the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Grimes v.
Cloutier06 has been approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Jensen v.
Tolofson.07 The Supreme Court held that the lex loci delicti should generally
be applied in tort cases. Justice La Forest delivered the leading judgment. His
Lordship referred 8 to what had been said by Justices Wilson and Gaudron
and by Justice Deane in Breavington v. Godleman 9 and continued:21
The nature of our constitutional arrangements - a single country
with different provinces exercising territorial legislative jurisdiction
- would seem to me to support a rule that is certain and ensures that
an act committed in one part of this country be given the same legal
effect throughout the country. This militates strongly in favor of the
lex loci delicti rule.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

69 O.R. (2d) 641 (1989).
15 Dec. 1994, unreported.
Id. 39-40 of print.
169 C.L.R. 41, 97-99, 1203 (Austl. 1988).
Id. 41 of print.
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